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Abstract 
Last July 19th the Mexican Federal Government concluded the auction of the 
1.9/2.1 GHz band blocks for Advance Wireless Services (AWS).  The auction 
design and the spectrum cap impose by the Federal Competition Commission 
led to the participation of only one bidder with a price at the minimum posted 
by the government for one of the two national coverage blocks put to auction. 
The remained nation block was not assigned because no bidders qualified and 
a third block identical to the national blocks was divided in 27 regional blocks 
but the auction final value was 28 times the minimum posted price for the 
national  block.  The  social  cost  and  the  implicit  subsidy  generated  by  the 
auction result obey to an industrial policy in telecommunication oriented to 
pick  winners  and  modify  the  market  structure  from  the  regulators  goals 
instead of the market evolution. 
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 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ1.9/2.1	 ﾠGHz	 ﾠband	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠauctions,	 ﾠby	 ﾠsimultaneous	 ﾠascendant	 ﾠ
bids,	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFederal	 ﾠGovernment	 ﾠfor	 ﾠAdvance	 ﾠWireless	 ﾠServices	 ﾠ
(AWS)	 ﾠended	 ﾠlast	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ19th.	 ﾠAWS	 ﾠwill	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠadvanced	 ﾠapplications	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠ3G	 ﾠservices	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠgeneration	 ﾠof	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐speed	 ﾠbroadband	 ﾠ
(LTE).	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ auction	 ﾠ consisted	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ blocks	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ 30	 ﾠ MHz	 ﾠ each	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ
national	 ﾠcoverage	 ﾠand	 ﾠ27	 ﾠblocks	 ﾠof	 ﾠ10	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠeach	 ﾠwith	 ﾠregional	 ﾠcoverage,	 ﾠ
distributed	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ3	 ﾠblocks	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ9	 ﾠregions	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠterritory	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠ divided	 ﾠ in.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ increment	 ﾠt h e 	 ﾠs p e c t r u m 	 ﾠu s e d 	 ﾠi n 	 ﾠt h e 	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
telecommunications	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ120	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠto	 ﾠ210	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠstill	 ﾠ
inferior	 ﾠto	 ﾠChile	 ﾠ(260	 ﾠMHz),	 ﾠBrazil	 ﾠ(350	 ﾠMHz)	 ﾠand	 ﾠIndonesia	 ﾠ(260)2.	 ﾠAt	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠauction	 ﾠend	 ﾠonly	 ﾠwere	 ﾠallocated	 ﾠ60	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠof	 ﾠ90	 ﾠauctioned	 ﾠ
therefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠin	 ﾠuse	 ﾠraise	 ﾠto	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ180	 ﾠMhz.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Mobile	 ﾠphones	 ﾠ“traditional”	 ﾠfrequency	 ﾠbands	 ﾠ(850	 ﾠMHz,	 ﾠ1900	 ﾠMHz)	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
being	 ﾠ used	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ existent	 ﾠ networks	 ﾠ (AMPS/DAMPS,	 ﾠ CDMA	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ GSM).	 ﾠ
Therefore,	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ available	 ﾠ spectrum	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ develop	 ﾠ 3G3	 ﾠa n d 	 ﾠ4 G 	 ﾠ
networks	 ﾠ (UMTS/HSPA	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ LTE),	 ﾠ which	 ﾠr e q u i r e s 	 ﾠa 	 ﾠb r o a d e r 	 ﾠb a n d . 	 ﾠ
Consequently,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ industry	 ﾠ tends	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ develop	 ﾠ 3G	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ 4G	 ﾠ Networks	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
new	 ﾠfrequencies,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠ1.7	 ﾠ/	 ﾠ2.1	 ﾠGHz	 ﾠ(AWS)	 ﾠor	 ﾠ700	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
broadband	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ enough	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ multiple	 ﾠ new	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ existing	 ﾠ operators	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
implement	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠallowing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmassification	 ﾠof	 ﾠbroadband	 ﾠservices	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠan	 ﾠextensive	 ﾠcoverage.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠauction	 ﾠresulted	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeserted	 ﾠnational	 ﾠblock	 ﾠof	 ﾠ30	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠwere	 ﾠno	 ﾠbidders,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠblock	 ﾠwas	 ﾠauthorized	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠone	 ﾠbidder,	 ﾠTelevisa-ﾭ‐Nextel4,	 ﾠacting	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠand	 ﾠwho	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
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2	 ﾠThe	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠusage	 ﾠin	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠis	 ﾠ593	 ﾠMHz,	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠis	 ﾠ265	 ﾠMHz,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Spain	 ﾠis	 ﾠ358	 ﾠMHz.	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠUntil	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauction	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone	 ﾠoperator,	 ﾠTelcel,	 ﾠhad	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠ3G.	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠGrupo	 ﾠTelevisa	 ﾠS.A.	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlargest	 ﾠmedia	 ﾠcompany	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSpanish-ﾭ‐speaking	 ﾠworld,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠa	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠplayer	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠentertainment	 ﾠbusiness.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠhas	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
television	 ﾠ production	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ broadcasting,	 ﾠ programming,	 ﾠ direct-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐home	 ﾠ satellite	 ﾠ
services,	 ﾠpublishing	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublishing	 ﾠdistribution,	 ﾠcable	 ﾠtelevision,	 ﾠradio	 ﾠproduction,	 ﾠ
show	 ﾠbusiness,	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠfilm	 ﾠand	 ﾠinternet	 ﾠportal.	 ﾠBy	 ﾠits	 ﾠcable	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠ
biggest	 ﾠtriple	 ﾠplay	 ﾠprovider	 ﾠin	 ﾠMexico	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcoverage	 ﾠin	 ﾠ77	 ﾠcities	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠMexico	 ﾠ
City	 ﾠand	 ﾠMonterrey	 ﾠMetropolitan	 ﾠareas.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ
minimum	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠamount.	 ﾠRegarding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregional	 ﾠblocks,	 ﾠTelcel5	 ﾠobtained	 ﾠ
21	 ﾠblocks	 ﾠdistributed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ9	 ﾠregions,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠTelefonica6	 ﾠgot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
block	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠregion	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠof	 ﾠsix	 ﾠregions.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdeserted	 ﾠblock	 ﾠhad	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
bidders	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrestrictions	 ﾠof	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠaccumulation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠlack	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠ	 ﾠObviously,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠminimum	 ﾠof	 ﾠ180.3	 ﾠ
million	 ﾠpesos	 ﾠ(13.9	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠUSD)	 ﾠprevailed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠnational	 ﾠcoverage	 ﾠblock	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1.7	 ﾠGHz	 ﾠband,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠended	 ﾠin	 ﾠfavor	 ﾠof	 ﾠTelevisa-ﾭ‐Nextel.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Similar	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhappened	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassignation	 ﾠof	 ﾠdark	 ﾠoptic	 ﾠfiber	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Federal	 ﾠElectricity	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠ(CFE	 ﾠas	 ﾠper	 ﾠits	 ﾠabbreviation	 ﾠin	 ﾠSpanish);	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠone	 ﾠbidder	 ﾠobtained	 ﾠit	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠminimum	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠamount.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
bidder	 ﾠ who	 ﾠ obtained	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ group	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ investors	 ﾠ integrated	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ
Telefonica,	 ﾠ Televisa	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Megacable7.	 ﾠ Mexico	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ auctioned	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ12,000	 ﾠmiles	 ﾠof	 ﾠdark	 ﾠoptical	 ﾠfiber	 ﾠalong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠelectricity	 ﾠ
transmission	 ﾠnetwork.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠconcession	 ﾠwas	 ﾠawarded	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ20	 ﾠyears	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠ legal	 ﾠ bidder,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ joint	 ﾠ bid	 ﾠ made	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ consortium	 ﾠ formed	 ﾠ ad	 ﾠ hoc	 ﾠ
(Telefonica	 ﾠ –	 ﾠM e g a c a b l e 	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠT e l e v i s a ) . 	 ﾠT h e 	 ﾠl a c k 	 ﾠo f 	 ﾠc o m p e t i t o r s 	 ﾠi n 	 ﾠt h e 	 ﾠ
auction	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠa	 ﾠwinner	 ﾠbid	 ﾠequal	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠminimum	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠestablished,	 ﾠ
68	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠUSD.	 ﾠAlso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠselection	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠwas	 ﾠquestioned	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠleft	 ﾠ
out	 ﾠa	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠbidder	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthird	 ﾠcellular	 ﾠoperator	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
second	 ﾠnational	 ﾠTV	 ﾠbroadcaster,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcompetition	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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5	 ﾠTelcel	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrand	 ﾠname	 ﾠin	 ﾠMexico	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠAmerica	 ﾠMovil.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠmobile	 ﾠ
telecommunications	 ﾠprovider	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠ71%.	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠTelefonica	 ﾠoperate	 ﾠin	 ﾠMexico	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMovistar	 ﾠbrand	 ﾠname,	 ﾠMovistar	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
second	 ﾠmobile	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠ21%.	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠMegacable	 ﾠHoldings	 ﾠSAB,	 ﾠMexico’s	 ﾠbiggest	 ﾠcable-ﾭ‐TV	 ﾠprovider	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcoverage	 ﾠin	 ﾠ231	 ﾠ
cities	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠtriple	 ﾠplay	 ﾠprovider	 ﾠin	 ﾠMexico.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ
authority	 ﾠ approved	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ consortium	 ﾠ joint	 ﾠ bid	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ otherwise	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠseparate	 ﾠcompetitors	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauction.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ needs	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ know	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ highly	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ operators	 ﾠ value	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
spectrum	 ﾠblocks	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠallocate	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠefficiently.	 ﾠA	 ﾠbid	 ﾠreveals	 ﾠ
approximately	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ bidder’s	 ﾠ valuation,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ fact	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ bid	 ﾠ underestimate	 ﾠ
value,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbidder	 ﾠis	 ﾠbidding	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsome	 ﾠprofit.	 ﾠBids	 ﾠare	 ﾠquite	 ﾠclose	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
value	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ enough	 ﾠ bidders	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ generate	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ bidding	 ﾠ
competition	 ﾠand	 ﾠbidders	 ﾠare	 ﾠconfident	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠestimates.	 ﾠAn	 ﾠauction,	 ﾠ
therefore,	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠabout	 ﾠraising	 ﾠmoney;	 ﾠit	 ﾠreveals	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠvaluable	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠblocks	 ﾠare	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠbidder	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠit	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
most.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠMexico	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠauction	 ﾠwas	 ﾠdistorted	 ﾠby	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠwas	 ﾠno	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠto	 ﾠefficient	 ﾠallocation	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠreveal	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠ
nationals	 ﾠblocks	 ﾠand	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠraise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthird	 ﾠblock	 ﾠdivided	 ﾠ
regionally	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdesign	 ﾠwas	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠshortage	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
entry	 ﾠbarriers	 ﾠto	 ﾠcompete	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠblocks.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠdetermining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
competition	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠblock,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcould	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠ
resulting	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠbiddings	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthird	 ﾠblock,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwas	 ﾠdivided	 ﾠregionally,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠin	 ﾠthree	 ﾠfractions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ10	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠper	 ﾠregion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠwe	 ﾠask	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
auction	 ﾠ value	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ duplicating	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ national	 ﾠ coverage	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Televisa-ﾭ‐Nextel	 ﾠ block	 ﾠ formed	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ regional	 ﾠ blocks?	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ answer,	 ﾠ
considering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠband	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ30	 ﾠMHz,	 ﾠis	 ﾠ$5,067.7	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠ
pesos	 ﾠ(389.8	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠUSD).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠTelevisa-ﾭ‐Nextel	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠpay	 ﾠ3.6%	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠauction	 ﾠindicated	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ
block	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ same	 ﾠ band	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ same	 ﾠ broad	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ MHz,	 ﾠo r 	 ﾠt h e 	 ﾠ
equivalent	 ﾠto	 ﾠ4.7%	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠbroadband	 ﾠbut	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠregion	 ﾠ9	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcovers	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFederal	 ﾠDistrict	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfederal	 ﾠstates	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Mexico,	 ﾠHidalgo	 ﾠand	 ﾠMorelos,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠpopulated	 ﾠregion	 ﾠand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
highest	 ﾠ income	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Mexico.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ difference	 ﾠ comes	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ having	 ﾠ
competition	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ national	 ﾠ block	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ having,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ regional	 ﾠ
blocks,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ competitive	 ﾠ environment	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ least	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ identified	 ﾠ
competitors:	 ﾠTelcel	 ﾠand	 ﾠTelefonica.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠblock	 ﾠobtained	 ﾠby	 ﾠTelevisa-ﾭ‐Nextel	 ﾠgives	 ﾠ30	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnine	 ﾠ
regions	 ﾠsimultaneously.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠother	 ﾠwords,	 ﾠit	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠ8	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠregions,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ30	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠin	 ﾠregion	 ﾠ9,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠregion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠ
contrasting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠregion	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠauction	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠa	 ﾠcompetitive	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠin	 ﾠregional	 ﾠblocks,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠ
ridiculous:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠpaid	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠregion	 ﾠ9,	 ﾠ$3,795.5	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠpesos	 ﾠis	 ﾠ21	 ﾠ
times	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠnational	 ﾠterritory.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
terms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠUS$0.38	 ﾠfor	 ﾠregion	 ﾠ9,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
whole	 ﾠnational	 ﾠterritory	 ﾠTelevisa-ﾭ‐Nextel	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠonly	 ﾠUS$0.0005	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
The	 ﾠtable	 ﾠabove	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠconsidering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ9	 ﾠregions,	 ﾠTelcel	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Telefonica	 ﾠacquired	 ﾠfractions	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠnational	 ﾠblock	 ﾠbreak	 ﾠup	 ﾠinto	 ﾠregional	 ﾠ
sections	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ equivalent	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Televisa-ﾭ‐Nextel	 ﾠa c q u i s i t i o n 	 ﾠf o r 	 ﾠa n 	 ﾠ
increased	 ﾠamount	 ﾠof	 ﾠ$5,067.7	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠto	 ﾠ$0.1818	 ﾠpesos	 ﾠper	 ﾠ
MHz	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita,	 ﾠ28	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠabove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠper	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
Televisa-ﾭ‐Nextel	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠblock.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠauction	 ﾠresults	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠof	 ﾠset-ﾭ‐aside	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠto	 ﾠTelevisa-ﾭ‐
Nextel.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠset-ﾭ‐aside	 ﾠis	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠex	 ﾠante	 ﾠsubsidy,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
directly	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentrants	 ﾠmoney,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠcreates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
effect	 ﾠby	 ﾠlimiting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠbidders	 ﾠand	 ﾠhence	 ﾠmanipulating	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠprice	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlicense	 ﾠdownwards.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTelevisa-ﾭ‐Nextel	 ﾠventure	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠno	 ﾠa	 ﾠentrant	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠNextel	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfourth	 ﾠwireless	 ﾠoperator	 ﾠin	 ﾠMexico	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠhas	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ4%	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket,	 ﾠmostly	 ﾠhigher-ﾭ‐end	 ﾠusers,	 ﾠallowing	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
earn	 ﾠmore	 ﾠper	 ﾠcontract	 ﾠthan	 ﾠmost	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠrivals.	 ﾠTelevisa	 ﾠacquired	 ﾠa	 ﾠ30%	 ﾠ
stake	 ﾠin	 ﾠNextel	 ﾠMexico,	 ﾠa	 ﾠunit	 ﾠof	 ﾠNII	 ﾠHoldings	 ﾠjust	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauction	 ﾠ
process	 ﾠstart.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠThe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠauction	 ﾠtook	 ﾠplace	 ﾠin	 ﾠAugust,	 ﾠ2006,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
concluded	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonth	 ﾠlater	 ﾠafter	 ﾠ161	 ﾠrounds.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠauction	 ﾠwas	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ1,087	 ﾠ
licenses	 ﾠin	 ﾠblocks	 ﾠper	 ﾠregions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠfrequencies	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
service	 ﾠ(AWS).	 ﾠIt	 ﾠgenerated	 ﾠa	 ﾠnet	 ﾠincome	 ﾠof	 ﾠ13.7billion	 ﾠdollars.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
areas	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ 250	 ﾠ thousand	 ﾠ inhabitants	 ﾠ approximately	 ﾠ 0.53	 ﾠ
dollars	 ﾠper	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita	 ﾠwere	 ﾠpaid.	 ﾠHistorically,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠof	 ﾠauctioned	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠhave	 ﾠhad	 ﾠa	 ﾠwide	 ﾠrange,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ$0.15	 ﾠper	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 7	 ﾠ
MHz	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1999	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠ$4.74	 ﾠper	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsale	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
NextWave	 ﾠand	 ﾠVerizon	 ﾠWireless	 ﾠof	 ﾠ10	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠin	 ﾠNew	 ﾠYork,	 ﾠalways	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
competitive	 ﾠenvironment.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠin	 ﾠMexico,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠblock,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠparticipation	 ﾠof	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone	 ﾠbidder	 ﾠis	 ﾠ0.0046	 ﾠdollars	 ﾠper	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita	 ﾠ
(118	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS	 ﾠaverage),	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠregion	 ﾠ9	 ﾠwas	 ﾠUS$0.38	 ﾠ(82	 ﾠ
times	 ﾠabove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprice	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠcoverage	 ﾠblock).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
When	 ﾠcomparing	 ﾠinternationally	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprice	 ﾠper	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠ
similar	 ﾠauctions	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠinto	 ﾠconsideration,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis:	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
frequency,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠuse,	 ﾠand	 ﾠadjusted	 ﾠby	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠand	 ﾠper	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠ
amount.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmetrics	 ﾠare	 ﾠinternationally	 ﾠknown	 ﾠand	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsame	 ﾠmetrics	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcomparatives,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠ
spectrum	 ﾠvaluation	 ﾠcompanies8.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ gross	 ﾠ domestic	 ﾠ product	 ﾠ (GDP)	 ﾠ differential	 ﾠ per	 ﾠ capita	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ
United	 ﾠStates	 ﾠand	 ﾠMexico	 ﾠis	 ﾠ3.25	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠOECD’s	 ﾠstatistics.	 ﾠ
Even	 ﾠconsidering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvariations	 ﾠin	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠrights	 ﾠand	 ﾠliabilities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠUS9,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠother	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠexcept	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
competition	 ﾠ absence	 ﾠ during	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ bidding:	 ﾠ A	 ﾠ differential	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ 115	 ﾠ times	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠper	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠamount	 ﾠpaid	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
spectrum	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠuse	 ﾠin	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠand	 ﾠMexico	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠcoverage	 ﾠblock	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1.7Ghz.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
8	 ﾠMadden, G., Saglam I., y Morey A., “Auction Design and the Success of the National 3G Spectrum 
Auctions” and Global View Partners, “Momentum Building in the AWS Band”. May, 2009.	 ﾠ
9	 ﾠMadden et al., provide empiric evidence on the effect of several variables on price per MHz per capita, 
using a sample of 21 international auctions between 2000 and 2007: to more income, more population and 
more Lifetime of the concession, the higher the price per MHz per capita. Nevertheless, annual fee right 
payment for the exploitation of the spectrum had not a statistically significant result. 
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The	 ﾠAnticompetitive	 ﾠEffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠLimiting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSpectrum	 ﾠPossession	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ main	 ﾠ objective	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ establishing	 ﾠ limits	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ broadband	 ﾠ is	 ﾠt o 	 ﾠ
maximize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠoperators	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
market	 ﾠpower.	 ﾠNonetheless,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠan	 ﾠinevitable	 ﾠcost	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠloss	 ﾠof	 ﾠefficiency	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠbe	 ﾠobtained	 ﾠfor	 ﾠaccessing	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
broader	 ﾠ band.	 ﾠ Such	 ﾠ efficiency	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ necessarily	 ﾠ mean	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ competitive	 ﾠ
effect	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠconsumption	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠand	 ﾠquality	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
wireless	 ﾠ broadband	 ﾠ service	 ﾠ (quality	 ﾠ measured	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ latency,	 ﾠ delay	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
error	 ﾠparameters	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠpackages).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ regulation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ 80	 ﾠ MHz	 ﾠ per	 ﾠ operator	 ﾠ must	 ﾠb e 	 ﾠe l i m i n a t e d 	 ﾠo r 	 ﾠ
substantially	 ﾠrelaxed	 ﾠif	 ﾠits	 ﾠpermanence	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠa	 ﾠnet	 ﾠcost.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ effectiveness	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ regulation	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ increasing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
operators	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠlower	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠcost	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠefficiency	 ﾠloss	 ﾠ
among	 ﾠoperators,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcould	 ﾠincur	 ﾠin	 ﾠlower	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 9	 ﾠ
regulation,	 ﾠas	 ﾠlong	 ﾠas	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠminimum	 ﾠefficient	 ﾠscale	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠa	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠ
band	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtop	 ﾠestablished.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠan	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠcost	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ user	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ he	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ quality	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ broadband	 ﾠ
services	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmobile	 ﾠaccess.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ limiting	 ﾠ the	 ﾠb r o a d b a n d 	 ﾠi s 	 ﾠr e p r e s e n t e d 	 ﾠb y : 	 ﾠi ) 	 ﾠt h e 	 ﾠ
possibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠminimum	 ﾠefficient	 ﾠscale,	 ﾠof	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠone	 ﾠoperator,	 ﾠ
exceeds	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ spectrum	 ﾠ limit	 ﾠ established,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ ii)	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ addition	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
efficiency	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoperators	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuser	 ﾠcomfort	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠ having	 ﾠ restrictions	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ quality	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ service	 ﾠ variety	 ﾠ offered	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
wireless	 ﾠaccess.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“Program	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfrequency	 ﾠbands	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠradio	 ﾠelectric	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
determined	 ﾠuses	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠauction”,	 ﾠpublished	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Ministry	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Communications	 ﾠa n d 	 ﾠT r a n s p o r t a t i o n 	 ﾠ( S C T 	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ per	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ
abbreviation	 ﾠin	 ﾠSpanish)	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOfficial	 ﾠGazette	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFederation	 ﾠ(DOF)	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠ March	 ﾠ 31,	 ﾠ 2008,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ regulatory	 ﾠ authorities	 ﾠ defined	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ band	 ﾠ
1710-ﾭ‐1770/2110-ﾭ‐2170	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠblocks	 ﾠof	 ﾠ20	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠand	 ﾠfive	 ﾠblocks	 ﾠof	 ﾠ10	 ﾠ
MHz	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnine	 ﾠPCS	 ﾠregions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbases	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
auction	 ﾠ(auction	 ﾠ21)	 ﾠmodified	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠsegmentation	 ﾠand	 ﾠwere	 ﾠdefined	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCOFETEL	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfavorable	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFederal	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
Competition	 ﾠ(CFC)	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
i)	 ﾠ A	 ﾠm a x i m u m 	 ﾠs p e c t r u m 	 ﾠa c c u m u l a tion	 ﾠ limit	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ 80	 ﾠ MHz	 ﾠ adding	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
possessed	 ﾠ spectrum	 ﾠ and/or	 ﾠ granted	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ concession	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ following	 ﾠ
bands:	 ﾠ 806-ﾭ‐821/851-ﾭ‐866	 ﾠ MHz,	 ﾠ 824-ﾭ‐849/869-ﾭ‐894	 ﾠ MHz,	 ﾠ 1850-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ 10	 ﾠ
1910/1930-ﾭ‐1990	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠand	 ﾠ1710-ﾭ‐1770/	 ﾠ2110-ﾭ‐2170	 ﾠMHz,	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcorresponding	 ﾠauctions.	 ﾠ
ii)	 ﾠModification	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoriginally	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠblocks	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠdefine	 ﾠ
them	 ﾠin	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠnational	 ﾠblocks	 ﾠof	 ﾠ30	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠeach	 ﾠand	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthree	 ﾠblocks	 ﾠof	 ﾠ10	 ﾠ
MHz	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnine	 ﾠPCS	 ﾠregions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ objective	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ having	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ spectrum	 ﾠ accumulation	 ﾠ limit	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ avoid	 ﾠ
monopolized	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture,	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoperators	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcould	 ﾠact	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
dominant	 ﾠ operators	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ having	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ spectrum	 ﾠa n d 	 ﾠs t o p p i n g 	 ﾠt h e 	 ﾠ
entrance	 ﾠto	 ﾠnew	 ﾠcompetitors.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreventive	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠhave	 ﾠhad	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠopposite	 ﾠeffect,	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠelevated	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoperating	 ﾠcost	 ﾠin	 ﾠfront	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠ
demand	 ﾠof	 ﾠbroadband	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠmore	 ﾠspectrum.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠoperators	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠKingdom	 ﾠand	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠhave	 ﾠmore	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
current	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠin	 ﾠLatin	 ﾠAmerican	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠlike	 ﾠMexico.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠabove	 ﾠmentioned,	 ﾠeliminating	 ﾠor	 ﾠsubstantially	 ﾠincrementing	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ spectrum	 ﾠ accumulation	 ﾠ limit	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ chosen	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ developed	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠ (in	 ﾠ 2003,	 ﾠ United	 ﾠ States	 ﾠ eliminated	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ limit	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ 55Mhz),	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ
shown	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠtable:	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Europe,	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠand	 ﾠMexico	 ﾠ
Country	 ﾠ/	 ﾠRegion	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
Operator	 ﾠ
Accumulated	 ﾠSpectrum	 ﾠ
per	 ﾠOperator	 ﾠ(MHz)	 ﾠ
Regulatory	 ﾠSpectrum	 ﾠ
Limit	 ﾠExistence	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠAverage	 ﾠ 92.6	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ
Germany	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 65	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ
United	 ﾠKingdom	 ﾠ 82.2	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ
France	 ﾠ 138.5	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 11	 ﾠ
Italy	 ﾠ 72.7	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ
Spain	 ﾠ 100.6	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ
Sweden	 ﾠ 92	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ
Denmark	 ﾠ 118.4	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ
Mexico	 ﾠ 80	 ﾠ Yes	 ﾠ
US-ﾭ‐	 ﾠVerizon	 ﾠWireless	 ﾠ National	 ﾠAverage:	 ﾠ89	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ
US-ﾭ‐	 ﾠAT&T	 ﾠ National	 ﾠAverage:	 ﾠ96	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ
US-ﾭ‐	 ﾠT-ﾭ‐Mobile	 ﾠ National	 ﾠAverage:	 ﾠ75	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠArthur	 ﾠD.	 ﾠLittle,	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ2008.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Internationally,	 ﾠa	 ﾠcompetition	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠacts	 ﾠupon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreally	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠ
practices	 ﾠhas	 ﾠprevailed	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠover	 ﾠrestrictive.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
limits	 ﾠare	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠdiscretionally	 ﾠand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠlack	 ﾠof	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠevolution	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠtechnologic	 ﾠrequirements,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠl i m i t 	 ﾠe s t a b l i s h e d 	 ﾠb y 	 ﾠFederal	 ﾠ Telecommunications	 ﾠ Commission	 ﾠ
(COFETEL)	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecommendation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFederal	 ﾠCompetition	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠ(CFC).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcap	 ﾠwas	 ﾠdiscretional	 ﾠand	 ﾠwas	 ﾠincompatible	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠexpectations	 ﾠfor	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmobile	 ﾠbroadband	 ﾠservices	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ years	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ come.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ limit	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ incremented	 ﾠ 15	 ﾠ MHz	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
technical	 ﾠrecommendation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠMobile	 ﾠbroadband	 ﾠof	 ﾠover	 ﾠ300	 ﾠMbps	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
LTE	 ﾠtechnology	 ﾠis	 ﾠ40	 ﾠ(2x20)	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast10.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠdamage	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcaused	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauction	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
stopping	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcurrence	 ﾠentrance	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauction	 ﾠof	 ﾠnational	 ﾠblocks	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
10	 ﾠEmerging	 ﾠTechnologies	 ﾠand	 ﾠTheir	 ﾠImplications	 ﾠon	 ﾠRegulatory	 ﾠPolicy,	 ﾠEricsson,	 ﾠITS	 ﾠBiennial	 ﾠPlenary,	 ﾠ
Montreal,	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ25th.	 ﾠ2008.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 12	 ﾠ
two	 ﾠways:	 ﾠi)	 ﾠsubsidizing	 ﾠTelevisa-ﾭ‐Nextel	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠit	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexclusive	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbidder	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠnational	 ﾠblock,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠallowed	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
keep	 ﾠa	 ﾠprice	 ﾠsubstantially	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠprice,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠa	 ﾠprice	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcompetition	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠof	 ﾠfree	 ﾠconcurrence;	 ﾠand	 ﾠii)	 ﾠ
preventing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentrance	 ﾠto	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠbidders	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠremaining	 ﾠregional	 ﾠ
block,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠby	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠdeserted	 ﾠit	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠrestricted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
supply	 ﾠof	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠuse	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Only	 ﾠby	 ﾠobserving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠamounts	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ86	 ﾠrounds	 ﾠof	 ﾠauction	 ﾠ21,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
corroborate	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ Televisa-ﾭ‐Nextel	 ﾠ did	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ need	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ increment	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠ initial	 ﾠ bid	 ﾠ (round	 ﾠ 1)	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ 180.3	 ﾠ million	 ﾠ pesos	 ﾠ due	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ lack	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
competition	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠblock,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠblock	 ﾠhad	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
bidder.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ contrasts	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ amounts	 ﾠ offered	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ rest	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
regional	 ﾠcoverage	 ﾠblocks.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ10	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠin	 ﾠregion	 ﾠ9,	 ﾠafter	 ﾠ
round	 ﾠ 86,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ bid	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ $1,059.5	 ﾠ million	 ﾠ pesos	 ﾠ( 8 1 . 5 	 ﾠm i l l i o n 	 ﾠU S D ) 	 ﾠw a s 	 ﾠ
observed,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠround	 ﾠ1	 ﾠbid	 ﾠwas	 ﾠof	 ﾠ24	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠpesos	 ﾠ(1.8	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠUSD).	 ﾠ
So,	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcompetition	 ﾠamong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbidders	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠblock,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠ
value	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ44	 ﾠtimes.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Therefore	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠdemonstrated	 ﾠthat	 ﾠregulatory	 ﾠauthorities,	 ﾠlike	 ﾠFederal	 ﾠ
Competition	 ﾠ Commission	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Federal	 ﾠ Telecommunications	 ﾠ
Commission,	 ﾠ make	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ common	 ﾠ mistake	 ﾠi n t e n d e d 	 ﾠo r 	 ﾠu n i n t e n d e d ,	 ﾠ
known	 ﾠby	 ﾠeconomics	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠbut	 ﾠignored	 ﾠby	 ﾠregulators,	 ﾠof	 ﾠregulating	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠspecifics	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠprovokes	 ﾠa	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠdamage	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
inherent	 ﾠ disadvantage	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ having	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ information	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ what	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
market	 ﾠreally	 ﾠrequires.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠanticompetitive	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 13	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠa	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠauthority,	 ﾠacting	 ﾠpreclusive	 ﾠmanner,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
letting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠcompanies	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠby	 ﾠacting	 ﾠfreely	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
market.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Both	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠjustify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠcap	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbias	 ﾠin	 ﾠfavor	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Televisa-ﾭ‐Nextel	 ﾠarguing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠconcentration	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMexican	 ﾠ
mobile	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOECD 11.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsuperficiality	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠignore	 ﾠ
Measurements	 ﾠ based	 ﾠ upon	 ﾠ market	 ﾠ shares	 ﾠ are	 ﾠp o o r 	 ﾠi n d i c a t o r s 	 ﾠo f 	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
level	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompetitive	 ﾠpressures	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwireless	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
fast	 ﾠ growing	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ driven	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ technological	 ﾠ innovation.	 ﾠ Hence,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
traditional	 ﾠ method	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ assessing	 ﾠ competition	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ inadequate.	 ﾠ On	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
contrary,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠmeasurements,	 ﾠa	 ﾠfew	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠsurrounded	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
competitive	 ﾠfringe,	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠindicator	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcompetitive	 ﾠpressures	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠintense.	 ﾠBasing	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeasurement	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠ over-ﾭ‐estimate	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ under-ﾭ‐estimate	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ competition	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
telecommunications	 ﾠis	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠideal12.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Public	 ﾠFinances	 ﾠDamage	 ﾠDue	 ﾠto	 ﾠ1.7	 ﾠGHz	 ﾠBand	 ﾠAuction’s	 ﾠDesign.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ concessionaires	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ 1.7	 ﾠ GHz	 ﾠ band	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ enjoy	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ almost	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ year	 ﾠ
period	 ﾠwith	 ﾠno	 ﾠrights	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠassigned	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠauction	 ﾠ
21,	 ﾠthanks	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAct	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠare	 ﾠreformed,	 ﾠadded	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
11	 ﾠMexico	 ﾠhas	 ﾠat	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠa	 ﾠ5,537.7	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHerfindahl	 ﾠIndex	 ﾠscale	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠrevenue	 ﾠ
per	 ﾠminute	 ﾠof	 ﾠ$0.06	 ﾠUSD	 ﾠclose	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ$0.04	 ﾠUSD	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS	 ﾠand	 ﾠefficient	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠspectrum,	 ﾠ
subscribers	 ﾠserved	 ﾠper	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠof	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠallocated	 ﾠof	 ﾠ661,666	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
660,073	 ﾠ(CTIA	 ﾠand	 ﾠGlenn	 ﾠCampbell,	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.,	 ﾠ“Global	 ﾠWireless	 ﾠMatrix	 ﾠ1Q09”,	 ﾠMerrill	 ﾠ	 ﾠLynch	 ﾠ
June	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
12	 ﾠBoyer,	 ﾠM.	 ﾠ“Optimal	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠRelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠSpectrum	 ﾠAuction”,	 ﾠMontreal	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠInstitute,	 ﾠ
May	 ﾠ25,	 ﾠ2007	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 14	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠabolished	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFederal	 ﾠLaw	 ﾠof	 ﾠRights	 ﾠpublished	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDOF	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
November	 ﾠ27,	 ﾠ2009.	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠAct	 ﾠwinning	 ﾠbidders	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1710-ﾭ‐
1770/2110-ﾭ‐2170	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠband	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠwill	 ﾠpay	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcorresponding	 ﾠrights	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse,	 ﾠprofiting	 ﾠor	 ﾠexploitation	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠfrom:	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠI.	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ1st,	 ﾠ2012,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcorresponding	 ﾠconcessions	 ﾠare	 ﾠdelivered	 ﾠ
no	 ﾠlater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ30,	 ﾠ2010.	 ﾠ
II.	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ1st,	 ﾠ2013,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcorresponding	 ﾠconcessions	 ﾠare	 ﾠdelivered	 ﾠ
after	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ1st,	 ﾠ2010.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
According	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ244-ﾭ‐E	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠFederal	 ﾠLaw	 ﾠof	 ﾠRights	 ﾠ(LFD	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
per	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ abbreviation	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Spanish),	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ concessionaires	 ﾠ obtaining	 ﾠ band	 ﾠ
spectrum	 ﾠ will	 ﾠh a v e 	 ﾠt o 	 ﾠp a y 	 ﾠt h e 	 ﾠc o r r e s p o n d i n g 	 ﾠr ights	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ use,	 ﾠ
enjoyment,	 ﾠprofiting	 ﾠor	 ﾠexploitation.	 ﾠTherefore,	 ﾠTelevisa-ﾭ‐Nextel	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠ
say	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠpay	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠprice	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠothers,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
established	 ﾠrights	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ1850-ﾭ‐1910/1930-ﾭ‐1990	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠband	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ244-ﾭ‐E).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrights	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠexception,	 ﾠTelevisa-ﾭ‐Nextel	 ﾠwill	 ﾠsave:	 ﾠ
•	 ﾠ $1,352	 ﾠ million	 ﾠ pesos	 ﾠ( 104	 ﾠ million	 ﾠ USD)	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ 30	 ﾠ MHz	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ
national	 ﾠ coverage,	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ concession	 ﾠ license	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ granted	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ August	 ﾠ 1st,	 ﾠ
2010.	 ﾠ
•	 ﾠ $1,909	 ﾠ million	 ﾠ pesos	 ﾠ (146.8	 ﾠ million	 ﾠ USD)	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ 30Mhz	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ
national	 ﾠcoverage,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcession	 ﾠlicense	 ﾠis	 ﾠgranted	 ﾠon	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ1st,	 ﾠ
2011.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 15	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ stated	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ exclusive	 ﾠ privilege	 ﾠc o n f e r r a l 	 ﾠw i t h 	 ﾠ
anticompetitive	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠof	 ﾠtelecommunications	 ﾠin	 ﾠMexico.	 ﾠ
Therefore,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠamong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbidders	 ﾠof	 ﾠauctions	 ﾠ
20	 ﾠand	 ﾠ21	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmobile	 ﾠphone	 ﾠconcessionaires	 ﾠwho	 ﾠalready	 ﾠhave	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠhave	 ﾠassigned	 ﾠ1850-ﾭ‐1910/1930-ﾭ‐1990	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠband	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
end	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauction,	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliability	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠthe	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠrights	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ244-ﾭ‐B	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLFD,	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠlifetime	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠlicenses.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Considering	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠof	 ﾠrights,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠundoubtful	 ﾠdamage	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠfinances	 ﾠresulting	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauction	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing:	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
i)  Discount	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠprice,	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprice	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcompetitive	 ﾠ
environment	 ﾠis	 ﾠequal	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbid	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠTelevisa-ﾭ‐Nextel	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠblock	 ﾠprice	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
regional	 ﾠ blocks	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ price	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ result	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ free	 ﾠ
competition	 ﾠamong	 ﾠbidders,	 ﾠprice	 ﾠused	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠapproximation	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ true	 ﾠ market	 ﾠ price.	 ﾠ Such	 ﾠ difference	 ﾠ goes	 ﾠ up	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ $4,887.4	 ﾠ
million	 ﾠpesos	 ﾠ(376	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠUSD),	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠ finances	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ getting	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ lower	 ﾠ payment	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ market	 ﾠ
price.	 ﾠ
ii)  Allowing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ entrance	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ consolidation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Televisa	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
Nextel	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ bidder	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ stopping	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ free	 ﾠ entry	 ﾠ mean	 ﾠa 	 ﾠ
national	 ﾠ“deserted”	 ﾠblock,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcost	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠgetting	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠ
price	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠblock.	 ﾠSo	 ﾠit	 ﾠprevent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠand	 ﾠincome	 ﾠof	 ﾠ$5,067.7	 ﾠ
millions	 ﾠ (389.8	 ﾠ million	 ﾠ USD)	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ auction	 ﾠ price	 ﾠ plus	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
rights	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠflow	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ19	 ﾠyears	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost,	 ﾠconsidering	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 16	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠyear	 ﾠof	 ﾠno	 ﾠpayment,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠflow	 ﾠis	 ﾠequal	 ﾠto	 ﾠ$8,677	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠ
(667.5	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠUSD)	 ﾠin	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠvalue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
finances	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ having	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ deserted	 ﾠ 30	 ﾠ MHz	 ﾠ block	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ $13,744.7	 ﾠ
million	 ﾠpesos	 ﾠ(1,057.3	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠUSD).	 ﾠ
iii)  The	 ﾠ total	 ﾠ fiscal	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ 1.7Ghz	 ﾠ band	 ﾠ blocks	 ﾠ auction	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
$18,632.1	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠpesos	 ﾠ(1,433.2	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠUSD),	 ﾠa	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠabove	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠclose	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFederal	 ﾠExpenditure	 ﾠBudget	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ program	 ﾠ supporting	 ﾠ bank	 ﾠ savers	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ debtors’	 ﾠo u t g o 	 ﾠ
$13,762.4	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠpesos	 ﾠplus	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠof	 ﾠJustice	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠNation’s	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠ$4,476.2	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠpesos.	 ﾠ
iv)  Another	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcost	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠderived	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoverpricing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠoperators	 ﾠwere	 ﾠforced	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠrestriction	 ﾠimposed	 ﾠby	 ﾠCFC	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
accepted	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ COFETEL	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ launched	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ price	 ﾠ rise	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
regional	 ﾠblocks.	 ﾠ
v)  The	 ﾠcost	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠno	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠblock	 ﾠdeclared	 ﾠdeserted,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠexcess	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
operators,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ discretionary	 ﾠ nature	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ blindness	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
CFE	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠrecommending	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠaccumulation	 ﾠlimits.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Additionally,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠworth	 ﾠmentioning	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ1710-ﾭ‐1770/2110-ﾭ‐2170	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠ
band	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ120	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠavailable,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSCT	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCOFETEL	 ﾠdecided	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
auction	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ90	 ﾠMHz.	 ﾠTherefore,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauction	 ﾠbases’	 ﾠdesign	 ﾠof	 ﾠ30	 ﾠ
MHz,	 ﾠ60	 ﾠMHz	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠassigned.	 ﾠHalf	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠband	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
mobile	 ﾠtelecommunication	 ﾠservices	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthough	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠavailable,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
subsequent	 ﾠ detriment	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ effective	 ﾠ development	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ sector,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 17	 ﾠ
resulting	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopposite	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthorities	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlooking	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
regarding	 ﾠcompetition	 ﾠand	 ﾠefficiency	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠresources	 ﾠuse.	 ﾠ
 
Final	 ﾠConsiderations	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ document	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ said	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ regulations,	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ
establishing	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ maximum	 ﾠ spectrum	 ﾠ holding	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ spectrum	 ﾠ cap	 ﾠp e r 	 ﾠ
operator,	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐benefit	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcost	 ﾠthat	 ﾠevery	 ﾠregulation	 ﾠgenerates,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠit	 ﾠcould	 ﾠgive	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠin	 ﾠstatic	 ﾠand	 ﾠdynamic	 ﾠterms.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ spectrum	 ﾠ cap	 ﾠr e g u l a t i o n 	 ﾠh a s 	 ﾠu n k n o w n 	 ﾠa n d 	 ﾠe v e n 	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐existent	 ﾠ
benefits	 ﾠas	 ﾠlong	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjective	 ﾠof	 ﾠlimiting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠis	 ﾠmaximizing	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ operators	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ market,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ objective	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ
necessarily	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠcompetition	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠcould	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠand	 ﾠlower	 ﾠinnovation,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠin	 ﾠdetriment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrivalry	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Currently	 ﾠ Mexico	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ active	 ﾠ industrial	 ﾠ policy	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
telecommunications	 ﾠmarket,	 ﾠpicking	 ﾠwinners	 ﾠand	 ﾠstopped	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠoperators.	 ﾠTelevisa	 ﾠand	 ﾠMegacable	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠtriple	 ﾠplay	 ﾠproviders	 ﾠ
don’t	 ﾠface	 ﾠany	 ﾠcompetition	 ﾠat	 ﾠall	 ﾠin	 ﾠconvergence	 ﾠservices	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠeach	 ﾠ
avoid	 ﾠto	 ﾠcompete	 ﾠeach	 ﾠother	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠlocation	 ﾠand,	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
regulators	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠTELMEX,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠtelephony	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠ
since	 ﾠits	 ﾠprivatization	 ﾠ20	 ﾠyears	 ﾠago,	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtriple	 ﾠplay	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ tacit	 ﾠ objective	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ subsidizing	 ﾠ alternative	 ﾠ networks	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ cable	 ﾠ
networks.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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The	 ﾠ Mexico	 ﾠ Government	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Regulators	 ﾠ include	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Federal	 ﾠ
Competition	 ﾠ Commission	 ﾠ modify	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ use	 ﾠ spectrum	 ﾠ caps	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ bias	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
auction	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠan	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdeciding	 ﾠwho	 ﾠreceives	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
right	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ use	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ spectrum	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ address	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ policy	 ﾠ goals	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ lack	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
transparency	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauction	 ﾠdesign	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcap	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠdecision.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
most	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernment,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠfavour	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ hopes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠw h a t 	 ﾠi t 	 ﾠt h i n k s 	 ﾠi s 	 ﾠg r e a t e r 	 ﾠcompetition,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ act	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
effective	 ﾠ regulator	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ make	 ﾠ sure	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ necessary	 ﾠ conditions	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
competition	 ﾠexist,	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠsafeguards.	 ﾠEx	 ﾠpost	 ﾠregulation,	 ﾠallows	 ﾠfreely	 ﾠ
experimentation	 ﾠand	 ﾠinnovation	 ﾠin	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠallowing	 ﾠdynamic	 ﾠ
efficiency.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Designating	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ entity	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ group	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ entities	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ special	 ﾠ
treatment	 ﾠhave	 ﾠadverse	 ﾠeffects.	 ﾠLeveling	 ﾠthe	 ﾠplaying	 ﾠfield	 ﾠmay	 ﾠenhance	 ﾠ
competition,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ favors	 ﾠt o 	 ﾠd e s i g n a t e d 	 ﾠe n tities	 ﾠ nullified	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ auction	 ﾠ
mechanism	 ﾠ benefits	 ﾠl e a d i n g 	 ﾠt o 	 ﾠt h e 	 ﾠ“ a b s o l u t e 	 ﾠw o r s t 	 ﾠo u t c o m e 	 ﾠi n 	 ﾠa 	 ﾠ
spectrum	 ﾠ auction…	 ﾠ licenses	 ﾠ tied	 ﾠ up	 ﾠ in	 ﾠl i t i g a t i o n . ” 13	 ﾠT h e 	 ﾠm e r e	 ﾠ risk	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
litigation	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ deter	 ﾠ bidding	 ﾠ activity,	 ﾠ lower	 ﾠ revenues	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
consequently	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐market	 ﾠoutcomes.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstrongest	 ﾠ
reasons	 ﾠ for	 ﾠs t r e n g t h e n i n g 	 ﾠe x 	 ﾠp o s t 	 ﾠr e g u l a t o r y 	 ﾠa p p r o a c h 	 ﾠi s 	 ﾠt h a t 	 ﾠt h e 	 ﾠ
regulatory	 ﾠ agency	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ insufficient	 ﾠ information	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ adopt	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
efficient	 ﾠex	 ﾠante	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCFC	 ﾠand	 ﾠCOFETEL	 ﾠdid	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauction	 ﾠ
design.	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠare	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ treasury	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ limiting	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ competitive	 ﾠ intensity	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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auction	 ﾠ process.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ we	 ﾠh a v e 	 ﾠs h o w n 	 ﾠa b o v e , 	 ﾠt h e 	 ﾠ auction	 ﾠ rules,	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ
determine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcompetitive	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlicenses	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠ
auctioned,	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ key	 ﾠe l e m e n t s 	 ﾠo f 	 ﾠt h e 	 ﾠs u c c e s s 	 ﾠo f 	 ﾠt h e 	 ﾠa u c t i o n 	 ﾠ
procedure.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ effective	 ﾠ reforms	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ spectrum	 ﾠ administration	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
maximize	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ competitive	 ﾠ environment	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ industry:	 ﾠ offering	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
greatest	 ﾠ amount	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ frequencies;	 ﾠ incrementing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ scope	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ property	 ﾠ
rights	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommercialization	 ﾠof	 ﾠassigned	 ﾠfrequencies	 ﾠamong	 ﾠ
private	 ﾠ companies;	 ﾠ eliminating	 ﾠ implicit	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ explicit	 ﾠ subsidies	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauctions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnew	 ﾠoperators	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠopportunist	 ﾠ
behaviors	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGovernment	 ﾠand	 ﾠeventually	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠwill	 ﾠpay;	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠidle	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠunused	 ﾠresource	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠabsorbed.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Mexico’s	 ﾠ case	 ﾠ illustrates	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ arbitrarily	 ﾠ establishing	 ﾠ spectrum	 ﾠ
limits	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ caps	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ use	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ regulation	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ anticompetitive	 ﾠ
purposes.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠworth	 ﾠmentioning	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Mexico	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ regulation	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ net	 ﾠ costs,	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ benefit,	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ
serving	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ regulatory	 ﾠ capture	 ﾠ vehicle,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ creating	 ﾠ rents	 ﾠ whose	 ﾠ
distribution	 ﾠ obeyed	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ entrance	 ﾠ subsidy,	 ﾠ overestimating	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
concentration	 ﾠindicators	 ﾠand	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠconsidering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠor	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠ
rivalry	 ﾠ among	 ﾠ operators,	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ damaging	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ competitive	 ﾠ
environment	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠevolution.	 ﾠIncreasing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠoperators	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠ necessarily	 ﾠ mean	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ gain	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ size	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
competitors	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ determined	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ market	 ﾠ size	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 20	 ﾠ
competitors’	 ﾠ optimum	 ﾠ scale	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ determined	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
administrative	 ﾠ process	 ﾠ resulting	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ imperfect	 ﾠ regulation	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ
respect	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket’s	 ﾠdynamics.	 ﾠ
 
 